CHAPTER ONE

The Subject: Religious Warfare in the Late Middle Ages and Early Reformation

1.1 THE STUDY OF RELIGIOUS WARFARE: APPROACHES AND PROBLEMS

Warfare and organized religious belief have been features of almost every human society in history, so an interaction between the two is never far from view. During the First World War, fought at a time when European society was relatively secularized, armies were exhorted to fight by a rhetoric which invoked God's aid for a national cause viewed as sacred. In the war's aftermath, the dead were remembered in annual celebrations cloaked in a liturgy and cultic ethos derived above all from religious traditions, while war memorials drew on an iconographic language which resonated with Christian values.[1] Both for public-spirited churchmen and rabble-rousers carried away by the nationalist excitement of the hour, and for communities devastated by losses on a hitherto unimaginable scale, religion provided invaluable terms of reference. The interaction between warfare and religion in an age before the massive changes wrought by the Enlightenment and the arrival of Mass Society was infinitely richer. In the Middle Ages and Early Modern period religious values did not simply provide terms of reference but a specific world-view which profoundly shaped the way contemporaries approached the practice of organized violence. In medieval Europe war was viewed as a means by which God's justice found expression, as a providential mechanism.[2] As Christine de Pisan put it in the early fifteenth century, 'warre & bataill whiche is made by iuste quarell is none other thing but

[1] W. J. Sheils (ed.), *The Church and War*, SCH 20 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); J. Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Amongst the more bizarre fruits of the excitement of 1914, Richard Sternfeld, a German Jew and Wagnerite who was also a distinguished historian of the Crusades, wrote a tract entitled 'Richard Wagner und der heilige deutsche Krieg': F. Spotts, *Bayreuth: A History of the Wagner Festival* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 155–6.

[2] J. T. Johnson, *Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts 1200–1740* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), ch. 1 *passim*.

right execucion of iustyce, for to gyue the right there as it apperteyneth'.[3] Theologically, war had its place in God's purpose for mankind.

But it is clear that some wars were different. They were viewed by contemporaries as belonging not just to the sphere of providence but to a more intimate association with God's purpose. A divine mandate lay behind them: in the language used in Gratian's *Decretum*, they were *Deo auctore bella*, wars originated by God.[4] The armies which waged them were made up of God's warriors, chosen by him and showing themselves to be worthy of his favour, intervention, and rewards. In many cases opponents were demonized, labelled as God's enemies or as servants of the devil. This type of combat is best described as religious or holy warfare (*guerres de religion*, *Glaubenskriege*), signalling the direct and defining connection between the war and its religious aims and character.[5] Contemporaries wrote of the conflict being 'sanctified': for example, the English chronicler Thomas Walsingham used the phrase in relation to the crusade,[6] while the Hussite bishop Nicholas of Pelhřimov deployed it when referring to the defensive war waged by the Hussite coalition.[7] It should be noted that the sanctification of the war (*bellum* for Walsingham, *prelium* for Pelhřimov) did not necessarily entail that of the individual act of violence, normally termed the *effusio sanguinis*. The divine mandating of violence was not normally an excuse for indiscriminate butchery; indeed, the Taborites, who believed that they were waging their war in God's name, approached the conduct of their war with particular circumspection for that very reason. They practised an economy rather than a totality of violence.[8]

In European history the two most important series of religious wars were the Crusades and the Wars of Religion. Both have been subject to substantial historical revision in recent years and the methodology behind this book has been heavily influenced by the approaches and outcomes of that process of revision. In some respects the present study is an attempt to establish with greater clarity the relationship between the Crusades and the Wars of Religion. But before coming to that it is important to adopt a broader perspective and consider the various attempts which have been made hitherto to analyse religious warfare as a recurrent phenomenon in history.

The subject has attracted quite a lot of scholarly attention in recent years,

[3] Christine de Pisan, *The Book of Fayttes of Armes and of Chyvalrye*, ed. A. T. P. Byles (London: Oxford University Press for Early English Text Society, 1932), 10. The translation is by William Caxton, who printed the work in 1489.

[4] E.-D. Hehl, 'Was ist eigentlich ein Kreuzzug?', *HZ* 259 (1994), 297–336, at 308.

[5] On the issue of definition see the discussion in J. T. Johnson, *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), ch. 2, esp. 45.

[6] Thomas Walsingham, *Historia anglicana*, ed. H. T. Riley, 2 vols. (London: Rolls Series, 1863–4), ii. 71–2.

[7] F. M. Bartoš, 'Táborské bratrstvo let 1425–1426 na soudě svého biskupa Mikuláše z Pelhřimova', *Časopis Společnosti přátel starožitností českých v Praze*, 29 (1921), 102–22, at 114.

[8] Cf. Johnson, *Holy War Idea*, 45–6.

partly because of the role played by religion in the various wars which were generated by the break-up of Yugoslavia. Thus a collection of essays edited by Peter Herrmann in 1996 was entitled *Glaubenskriege in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* and included an essay by Thomas Bremer dealing specifically with contemporary Yugoslavia.[9] Herrmann's collection was followed a year later by Peter Partner's *God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam*.[10] Partner's book was extremely fruitful. Its chief strength resides in his comparison of the Christian and Muslim practice of religious war; indeed, since he included chapters dealing with the Ancient Israelites, the Maccabean revolt, and the Zealots, all three of the great monotheistic religions are covered. Another strength is Partner's detailed knowledge and treatment of the persistence of the *jihad*, the Islamic war for the faith, in the period since *c.*1700, notably in struggles against the colonial powers in Africa and Asia. His comparative approach, and his brave decision to handle the *longue durée*, yielded many insights. He showed that Christian and Islamic religious war share a protean nature, which enabled them to revive in remarkably changed surroundings. In both cases religious war has been directed inwards against heretical groups, indeed in the case of Islam this type of *jihad* has perhaps been dominant over the centuries. During the Gulf War of 1991 both Saudi Arabia and Iraq secured declarations from their religious authorities (*'ulama*) to the effect that their war against each other was a *jihad*.[11] Less convincing was Partner's argument that the overall balance sheet of *jihad* has been fuller than Christian religious war in terms of 'internalized' struggle, holy war in a mainly moral sense. He pointed in particular to the writings of the Pakistani Islamic reformer Mawlana Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903–79), who portrayed *jihad* as a form of moral and political activism in the context of modernization.[12] Yet this seems to ignore a good deal of crusading ideology, especially around 1200, as well as a rich seam of argumentation by humanists some three centuries later, not to speak of Loyola and other Counter-Reformation thinkers.[13] On the other hand, it is precisely the merit of Partner's approach that he invites disagreement and debate by setting out his argument in broad terms.

'The history of holy war, from the Biblical Hebrews to our own times, is a history of texts belonging to scriptural religions; it is also a history of human behaviour. The violence that men do, they seek to justify.'[14] This reference by Peter Partner to the important role played by Scripture within all the traditions which he examined serves as an introduction to a second approach towards the study of

[9] P. Herrmann (ed.), *Glaubenskriege in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996). Thomas Bremer's essay is 'Religiöse Motive im jugoslawischen Konflikt der Gegenwart', 139–51.

[10] P. Partner, *God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam* (London: Harper Collins, 1997).

[11] Ibid. 260. [12] Ibid. 234–6.

[13] See, e.g., C. T. Maier, 'Crisis, Liturgy and the Crusade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries', *JEH* 48 (1997), 628–57.

[14] Partner, *God of Battles*, p. xvi.

religious warfare. This is the analysis of particular texts as justifications or mandates for the conduct of violence in God's name. It is best represented by an article written by Michael Walzer, 'Exodus 32 and the Theory of Holy War: The History of a Citation'.[15] Exodus 32: 26–8 describes how Moses recruits the sons of Levi to carry out a ruthless programme of execution in the name of God.

> Then Moses stood in the gate of the camp, and said 'Who is on the Lord's side? Come to me!' And all the sons of Levi gathered around him. He said to them, 'Thus says the Lord, the God of Israel, "Put your sword on your side, each of you! Go back and forth from gate to gate throughout the camp, and each of you kill your brother, your friend, and your neighbour." ' The sons of Levi did as Moses commanded, and about three thousand of the people fell on that day.[16]

Walzer first pointed out that this was a highly unusual passage because God, acting through Moses, uses human agency to punish the wicked; at other times in Exodus and Numbers the agency is non-human, notably fire, plague, and serpents. This establishes the significance of the text for anyone interested in sacred violence.

Walzer then proceeded to set out the three main citations of the text. The first was by St Augustine, who used it to justify the persecution of the Donatists, arguing that the difference between the oppressive behaviour of Pharaoh and that of Moses, evidenced in Exodus 32: 26–8, lay precisely in motive, which in Moses' case was loving chastisement. The second citation was that of Aquinas. In contrast to Augustine, he saw the passage as dangerous, because of the interpretation which had been given to it by the radical reformers of the eleventh century. They had emphasized the duty of latter-day Levites, as men of God, to use violent means in order to purge the church of evil. For Aquinas this was an unacceptable invitation to disorder, and he countered this exegesis by arguing that this was Old Law and bore no relevance to the New Dispensation. Finally, there was Calvin's interpretation of the text. He returned to the Augustinian viewpoint that the text pointed the way for contemporary Christians to behave, but radicalized it substantially. The mediation of Moses, so important for Augustine, was superseded by the Protestant view of the elect being directly mandated by God, and the full grimness of the task which faced the new Levites was emphasized in terms of their having to kill their own brethren in God's service.[17]

[15] M. Walzer, 'Exodus 32 and the Theory of Holy War: The History of a Citation', *Harvard Theological Review*, 61 (1968), 1–14.

[16] For quotations from the Bible I use *New Revised Standard Version: Anglicized Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[17] For a directly equivalent reading on the Catholic side see R. R. Harding, 'Revolution and Reform in the Holy League: Angers, Rennes, Nantes', *Journal of Modern History*, 53 (1981), 379–416, at 412–13; B. Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 151.

Walzer's analysis of these exegetical changes was a true *tour de force*, and he performed the service of showing how rich the evolving dialectic between text and circumstance could be. As he put it, 'In these interpretations the three men reveal themselves and the special anxieties of their times . . . All three of them were forced to be biblical lawyers, but God's law in their hands was as different as men and ages could make it.'[18] All three views of Exodus 32: 26–8 were to find expression amongst the writings of men whose ideas will be considered in the following pages: indeed, in some ways the Augustinian, Thomist, and Calvinist interpretations of these three verses in Exodus formed the kernels of mainstream approaches towards the legitimate use of violence in God's name. But this is not to say that a similar approach could not prove as fruitful in the case of certain other passages of Scripture. Particularly interesting would be its application to the Book of Daniel, which Partner aptly described as 'a kind of meditation upon holy war, that purported to unveil secret things, and to predict the execution of divine judgement'.[19] An exception to the general failure to follow in Walzer's footsteps has been the attention given to the Book of Revelation, in the context of the recent proliferation of apocalyptic studies. Not surprisingly, this attention has resulted not in a demonstration of how rival interpretations have been forged, but in a general emphasis on how influential the imagery, arithmetic, and precise sequencing of events in Revelation were throughout the later Middle Ages and Early Modern period.[20]

Professional historians have not held a monopoly over interest in religious warfare. Present-day Christian authorities and thinkers have viewed it as a topic of concern. As part of its celebration of the Jubilee Year 2000 the Vatican issued an extraordinary document, 'Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and the Faults of the Past', which *inter alia* acknowledged guilt and sought forgiveness for the Catholic church's sponsorship and use of violence in the past. Naturally the Crusades and the Wars of Religion loomed large in the Vatican's view of how Christ's message of peace had been, in its eyes, drastically traduced.[21] Such interest in the church's historical track record has generated at least one study which felicitously combines a whole range of disciplines, notably theology, history, and sociology, in an attempt to answer its title's question, *Does Christianity Cause War*? (1997). David Martin's book, which originated as a series of lectures given at Oxford, forms a critique of Richard Dawkins's argument that religion has indeed caused wars. A certain tendency to dehistoricize is inevitable given

[18] 'Exodus 32', 14.

[19] Partner, *God of Battles*, 16. E. Marsch, *Biblische Prophetie und chronographische Dichtung. Stoff- und Wirkungsgeschichte der Vision des Propheten Daniel nach Dan. VII* (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1972), is useful on Daniel 7.

[20] R. K. Emmerson, *Antichrist in the Middle Ages: A Study in Medieval Apocalypticism, Art, and Literature* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981); R. K. Emmerson and B. McGinn (eds.), *The Apocalypse in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).

[21] *Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and the Faults of the Past* (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2000).

the sheer breadth of Martin's approach, but it is compensated for by his virtuosity, his insights about the complex nature of communities, and his demonstration of how belief systems become absorbed into structures shaped by a multitude of other factors. In a chapter on semiotics, Martin referred to the inherently oxymoronic nature of Christianity, 'the first being last, the lord being servant, God becoming Man, strength achieved in weakness, and life saved in self-giving'. As he went on to remark, 'the primary oxymoron is the warfare of the cross and the whole armour of salvation. Christianity captured the language of war for the purpose of peace. But no victory of that kind is fully secure.'[22] Communities facing crises which could apparently only be resolved by violent means were able to exploit this without great difficulty. As we have seen, the exegetical traditions were already at hand or could be created for the occasion, and collective assurance came from a liturgy and sign language which were themselves pervaded by ambiguity.

Martin believed that the answer to his book's title question is in the negative because what appear to be religious wars turn out on close examination to involve communities which defined themselves largely in religious terms embarking on conflict because of the particular circumstances in which they found themselves. The key phase is 'markers of difference', which historically have centred for the most part around religion and ethnicity. Normally these do not generate conflict, but when such conflict occurs they are mobilized and may very easily be misread as the causation of the violence. Martin employed the contemporary example of Yugoslavia. The conflict between Serbia and Bosnia was clearly not at root a clash of Orthodox against Muslim: it sprang from the break-up of Yugoslavia. But religious markers, alongside ethnic ones, became dominant conduits of hostility during the war.[23] The situation was made more complicated by the historical tendency for most European national communities to be couched and defined in religious terms: 'Any Christian group, defending itself or, indeed, setting out on colonizing adventure, can be another Chosen and Elect People.'[24] Because of the belligerence running through European history like Ariadne's thread, this led to many wars being depicted in language borrowed from the Old Testament. But it need not have been so: the last example cited by Martin is Brazil, 'a society thoroughly animated by the presumption of a spiritual world but not on that account generating violence, either internally between faiths or externally'.[25]

Martin's whole argument is based on his conviction that there existed an 'irreducible core' of Christian belief, 'the original deposit of faith espoused by the obscure Galilean fraternity'. Manifestly it included the rejection of the sword, and the ambiguities which he saw as responsible for the later embrace of war came about when the church made its series of compromises with 'judges,

[22] D. Martin, *Does Christianity Cause War?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 113.

[23] Ibid. 15–20. There is a more extended examination of the situation in Yugoslavia in A. Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), ch. 5. See also Bremer, 'Religiöse Motive'.

[24] Martin, *Does Christianity Cause War?*, 150.

[25] Ibid. 219.

senators and consuls'.[26] The distinction plays a crucial role in enabling him to deny that what seem to be religious wars really merit that name. To anybody who believes that Christian history is that of the church, embodying Martin's 'original deposit' and subjecting it to the many tests of human development, the question in his title is much less easily answered. As we have seen, the Vatican, which naturally subscribes to the latter view, has abandoned any attempt to make such distinctions. Instead it has accepted that religious wars were waged, viewing this as a culpable aspect of Christian history, but arguing too that the positive features of the Catholic church's past produce a balance sheet which is overwhelmingly laudable. Whatever one's stance in this debate, David Martin's analysis of the causality of wars associated with religion remains highly relevant because of his concern to distinguish between the root causes of conflicts and the collective convictions and identities which have sustained the combatant powers. This concern has been shared by many historians and it is necessary to address their arguments.

In the first place, there have always been historians who have emphasized the economic or political causality of those wars which have involved religious values, rituals, or language. For such individuals, to designate certain conflicts as religious wars is to misconstrue a complex causal process and to place such conflicts within an artificial category. This argument would hold water if one were claiming that religious differences, goals, and perceptions were the *only* factors causing a particular war and shaping its course and outcome. But the days of such reductionism are long past. Again, Partner strikes the correct balance: 'There have been no holy wars fought for an exclusively idealistic motive, and the historiography that sets up purity of intention as a criterion for holy war is mistakenly moralistic in its methods.'[27] Natalie Zemon Davis made a similar point in the context of religious rioting: 'just as the prevalence of pillaging in a war does not prevent us from typing it as a holy war, so the prevalence of pillaging in a riot should not prevent us from seeing it as essentially religious.'[28] Indeed, the danger today lies much less in the offering of an exclusively religious interpretation of any war than of religious values being dismissed as camouflage or propaganda. No historian of the Crusades or the Wars of Religion now writing would exclude a whole range of political, economic, and social considerations from a study of those conflicts,[29] and the same applies to the warfare which we shall be examining in this study. For example, the finest recent account of the Hussite revolution, František Šmahel's *La Révolution hussite: une anomalie historique* (1985), has the great merit of surveying the whole complex of secular factors involved, including the temptation which a well-endowed Bohemian church posed to an impoverished lesser nobility, and the political reasons which persuaded the

[26] Ibid. 113–14. [27] Partner, *God of Battles*, 309.

[28] N. Z. Davis, 'The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France', *Past and Present*, 59 (1973), 51–91, at 65.

[29] See, e.g., M. P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3.

country's magnates to sponsor religious reform. Šmahel amply demonstrated the links between these and many other factors, and the course and character taken by the Hussite wars. Yet this did not lead him to play down the importance of religious goals, and he reiterated their formative influence on the way the Hussites conducted their war.[30] Describing a particular conflict as a religious war is not an attempt to place it in an interpretative ghetto, but to throw fresh light on its character. It is justified if it enables us better to understand what occurred, through the techniques of comparative analysis.

This too, of course, goes beyond what some historians regard as sound practice. A good example resides in Tom Scott's major contribution towards the study of the German Peasants' War of 1524–5, 'Reformation and Peasants' War in Waldshut and Environs'.[31] The article forms a critique of the view that what brought townsmen and peasants into alliance during this war was their common subscription to Luther's revolutionary message. As Peter Blickle, chief proponent of this view, put it, 'what united the common project of peasants and townsmen was the gospel, or more precisely, the transformation of Reformation theology into a political theology'.[32] Looking closely at what happened in Waldshut and its region, Scott concluded that 'the complex pattern of Waldshut's relations with the peasants suggests that the origins of alliances between town and country in the Peasants' War and their contribution to its radicalization depended less upon the impact of an overriding extraneous ideology than upon the circumstances in which those alliances were formed'.[33] This argument found broader and brusquer expression in another article published a year later on the historiography of the war. Scott stated that he found it 'rather far-fetched to argue that burghers and peasants fought side-by-side in 1525 in the name of a *libertas christiana* based upon their shared commitment to the ideal of the Christian community'.[34] Others have disagreed, and there is an a priori rejection of the power of ideas in Scott's comment which is epistemological rather than evidential in character.[35] His conclusions about Waldshut command respect because of the solid archival sources which underpin them, and it may well be the case that the extraordinarily broad-based character of the German Peasants' War makes general conclusions as to the impact on it of religious

[30] F. Šmahel, *La Révolution hussite: une anomalie historique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985).

[31] T. Scott, 'Reformation and Peasants' War in Waldshut and Environs: A Structural Analysis', *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, 69 (1978), 82–102, 70 (1979), 140–68.

[32] P. Blickle, *The Revolution of 1525: The German Peasants' War from a New Perspective*, trans. T. A. Brady Jr. and H. C. E. Midelfort, 2nd edn. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 115.

[33] Scott, 'Reformation and Peasants' War', 70 (1979), 168.

[34] T. Scott, 'The Peasants' War: A Historiographical Review', *Historical Journal*, 22 (1979), 693–720, 953–74, at 961.

[35] The same is true of J. Szűcs, 'Die Nation in historischer Sicht und der nationale Aspekt der Geschichte', in his *Nation und Geschichte. Studien*, trans. J. Kerekes et al. (Gyoma: Corvina Kiadó, 1981), 11–160.

ideas more than usually hazardous. Outside the special context of that conflict, however, there is a clear danger in insisting that only the closest and most detailed of studies can enable us to reconstruct what happened and why. The hegemony of the particular easily becomes the tyranny of the circumstantial.

It is worth emphasizing this general point about the nature of historical analysis because there is a trend in contemporary research to deny the existence of patterns, and to question attempts to formulate categories and types on that basis. A good example of the trend is Felipe Fernández-Armesto's *Millennium* (1995), an account of the past thousand years of world history. To attempt such a survey at all was an audacious undertaking, but it was made the more so by Fernández-Armesto's disarming avowal that he offered no patterns or interpretations. It was an approach which would have been unthinkable in the past when embarking on a survey of such ambitious scope. But for Fernández-Armesto, 'history is chaotic—a turbulence which happens at random or in which the causes are often in practice impossible to trace'. It was 'a mosaic made by a monkey'.[36] One distinguished historian has suggested that this disconcerting trend is the result of historians being influenced by chaos theory in the sciences.[37] Clearly this book would be impossible to write if I subscribed to the trend: on the contrary, I believe not only that there are patterns and developments to be established, but that it is one of the practising historian's tasks, and a particularly stimulating one, to identify and explain them.

This is not to deny that the task of elucidation is particularly challenging when we are dealing with religious belief. The latter is bound to raise problems of assessment and interpretation which are inherently different from those thrown up by political or economic history. Peter Russell's recent life of Prince Henry 'the Navigator' of Portugal illustrates the situation very well.[38] Throughout his adult life Henry was obsessed with crusading in Morocco, and Russell entirely avoids the trap, referred to earlier, of trying to explain it in terms of hoped-for economic gain. On the contrary, he shows that in material terms Portugal's (and Henry's) advantage lay overwhelmingly in the maintenance of peaceful relations with Morocco. How then to explain this obsession in a man who in almost all other aspects of his career was guided by hopes of material gain, and who was both cynical and opportunistic in his relations with his family and the popes? Russell gets around the problem by writing of two Henrys, the crusading hothead and the level-headed entrepreneur and administrator. He writes of Henry slipping into 'crusading mode', using 'Henry-speak', and putting on his 'crusader's rig'. This is engaging but it evades the problem of understanding Henry in full, a difficulty which Russell frankly accepts as insurmountable. The problem is deepened still

[36] F. Fernández-Armesto, *Millennium* (London: Bantam, 1995), 8, 10.

[37] D. H. Akenson, *God's Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel, and Ulster* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 351–3.

[38] P. Russell, *Prince Henry 'the Navigator': A Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

further by the fact that Henry was undeniably capable of casuistry and dissimulation in pursuit of his crusading goals: this could easily cause us to question his motivation had Russell not so clearly ruled out the hope of gain.[39]

It may be suggested that the answer to this conundrum lies in taking a leaf out of David Martin's book and arguing that Henry's motivation was not so much religious as chivalric, that it derived from those codes of honour and fame onto which crusading had been grafted and which, in Henry's time, represented one of the key impulses behind the persistence of crusading's popularity.[40] This is a tempting approach to take, because it enables us to shift the explanation for his behaviour away from the hidden arena of Henry's psychological make-up and religious beliefs, into a more tangible and comprehensible world of knightly orders, courtly magnificence, battlefield heroics, and splendid tombs. But it remains an evasion. There is no substitute for considering seriously what rulers like Henry said about the religious goals of their wars, hard as it often is to sort the wheat of intent from the chaff of rhetoric and propaganda. It calls for empathy. In her study *Chivalry and Exploration 1298–1630*, Jennifer Goodman struck an important chord in this regard when she appealed for attempts to use the imagination in order to grasp the chivalric and crusading thinking of men like Henry the Navigator: 'The resurgence of old patterns—of feudal relationships, of cults of personal honor and vengeance, of holy wars—strikes the modern sceptic as inconceivable . . . All this territory of the mind cries out to be rediscovered.'[41]

As if trying to grasp the religious beliefs of individuals were not enough, we also face the problem of analysing the behaviour of groups. This may seem more difficult, but in fact there is a growing consensus on the validity of using such indicators as patterns of group activity, and the symbols and rites which are important to groups, as means of understanding their psychology.[42] There is also the possibility of comparative study, which has been attempted by a number of historians in the case of revolts, with stimulating results.[43] The best comparative

[39] Russell, *Prince Henry*, 21–2, 35, 50, 54, 72, 180, 190, 271, 294, 326, 361.

[40] See my *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 394–403.

[41] J. R. Goodman, *Chivalry and Exploration 1298–1630* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1998), 24, and cf. her comments on 219.

[42] L. Millward, 'Social Psychology 2', in M. Eysenck (ed.), *Psychology: An Integrated Approach* (Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), 356–406; M. A. Hogg and G. M. Vaughan, *Social Psychology*, 2nd edn. (Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall, 1998), 375–85. I am grateful to Anne Colley for drawing my attention to these studies. See also the comments in my 'Insurrection as Religious War, 1400–1536', *JMH* 25 (1999), 141–54, repr. in *CWMRE*, study VIII, at 152–3.

[43] See, e.g., F. G. Heymann, 'The Hussite Revolution and the German Peasants' War: An Historical Comparison', *Medievalia et humanistica*, NS 1 (1970), 141–59; F. Seibt, 'Tabor und die europäischen Revolutionen', *Bohemia: Jahrbuch des Collegium Carolinum*, 14 (1973), 33–42, repr. in F. Seibt, *Hussitenstudien: Personen, Ereignisse, Ideen einer frühen Revolution* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1987), 175–84; F. Seibt, 'Die hussitische Revolution und der Deutsche Bauernkrieg', in P. Blickle (ed.), *Revolte und Revolution in Europa*, *HZ* NS suppl. vol. 4 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1975), 47–61, repr. in Seibt,

analysis works toward the creation of types, an approach which has much to offer. For example, Gary Dickson has recently proposed six typical characteristics of religious revivalism in the Middle Ages, ranging from a concern with revitalizing orthodox religious culture, through to an attempt to create a specific context for that revitalization in a community which has been morally purified (most typically a monastic house or order, or a city).[44] As Dickson admits, he is building on the work of others, including Norman Cohn, whose *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, a study of popular millenarian movements in the Middle Ages, still exercises great influence nearly half a century after it was first published.[45] A striking feature of Cohn's study, and surely one reason for its enduring appeal, resides in its author's indefatigable search for patterns and trends in movements which at first sight seem extremely disparate. The methodology practised by Cohn and advocated by Dickson, analytical, comparative, and empathetic without being ingenuous, is broadly speaking that which will be applied to the insurrectionary armies with which, in part, this study is concerned.

The difficulties involved in analysing religious warfare are apparent: what are the potential gains? They are twofold. First, the range of military conflicts which we shall be investigating took place. Whether they were wars between communities which we now regard as states, insurrections taking place within those states, or conflicts fought between groups which formed along confessional lines of division, the significance of these activities is unquestionable.[46] Assessing as precisely as we may how religious programmes and values informed and shaped them will clarify them as historical events. Much the same applies to the backcloth of writing about religious warfare, favourable and critical, polemical and reflective, which as we shall see formed a constantly revealing commentary on events. We can hope to emerge with a fuller understanding of how far warfare in this period was permeated by religious conviction to the extent that combatants believed themselves to be God's warriors, acting at his command and, in the most explicit sense, implementing his purpose for his creation.

The second gain is more specific. As I remarked earlier, both the Crusades and the Wars of Religion have recently received a good deal of attention, and two of the major revisions are fundamental for this study. In the case of the Crusades, we are now much more conscious of their longevity. We have freed ourselves from the narrow definition of crusade which associated it exclusively with wars

Hussitenstudien, 217–28; P. Blickle, 'Peasant Revolts in the German Empire in the Late Middle Ages', *Social History*, 4 (1979), 223–39; P. Freedman, 'The German and Catalan Peasant Revolts', *AHR* 98 (1993), 39–54.

[44] G. Dickson, 'Revivalism as a Medieval Religious Genre', *JEH* 51 (2000), 473–96, esp. 491–3.

[45] N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*, rev. and expanded edn. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[46] Military activity which was organized and conducted by the religious Military Orders poses a separate set of methodological issues, and will not be considered in this book. For an overview, see A. Luttrell, 'The Military Orders, 1312–1798', in J. Riley-Smith, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 326–64.

fought to conquer or defend the Holy Land, wars which came to an end in 1291; and we have become aware of the persistence of crusading into at least the early sixteenth century.[47] It is a breakthrough of vital importance for this book. Historians of *mentalités* in the late Middle Ages and Renaissance had long acknowledged the persistence of the idea of crusade. Yvonne Labande-Mailfert wrote in 1975 that 'it would be impossible to exaggerate the diffusion of the idea of crusade in the West at the close of the fifteenth century; and the start of the sixteenth would signal a revival of these aspirations',[48] while Alain Milhou commented in 1983 that 'the history of the idea of crusade after the crusades themselves [sc. 1291 onwards] is that of the disintegration of the various elements which constituted it'.[49] Both are valid and telling comments but they do not go far enough. For it has now been established that, important as aspirations and ideas were, a great deal more was involved. A part of the background to all the conflicts which we shall examine was a concurrent pattern of crusade preaching, exhortations, and in some cases crusading activity. The key elements of crusading, vow, cross, and indulgence,[50] remained features of European religious and public life throughout the period studied in this book. Crusading, and religious war in the non-crusading sense, incessantly criss-crossed, producing an interaction which was much more fertile than it would have been had aspirations and ideas alone been at stake. Sometimes, as in Hussite Bohemia, they were in brutal conflict, producing the extraordinary result of several religious wars being simultaneously in operation. At other times, as in Portugal and Castile, a fruitful symbiosis took place, crusade forming, as it were, the 'cutting edge' of a broader surge of ideas generated by chivalric values, national feeling, and prophetic expectations. On at least one occasion, György Dózsa's revolt of 1514 in Hungary, a more complex interaction can be traced, one which involved both insurrection (as in Bohemia) and triumphalist orthodoxy (as in Iberia). What is certain is that a relationship existed throughout. Although the crusade retained institutional solidity through features which were now familiar, indeed scarcely changing, it was subject to some of the same pressures and developments which affected religious warfare in the broader sense.

As for the Wars of Religion, one of the most remarkable recent changes has been an acceptance of how fully the salient features of the confessional divide found expression in the habits of violence which they generated.[51] This applies

[47] Housley, *Later Crusades*, *passim*.

[48] Y. Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII et son milieu (1470–1498): La Jeunesse au pouvoir* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1975), 185.

[49] A. Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica en el ambiente franciscanista español* (Valladolid: Casa-Museo de Colón Seminario Americanista de la Universidad de Valladolid, 1983), 290.

[50] The term crusade will be used in this book when these elements are present. See J. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?* (London: Macmillan, 1977). C. Tyerman, *The Invention of the Crusades* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 100–9, has useful comments on crusading in the 16th cent.

[51] See, e.g., B. Scribner, 'Preconditions of Tolerance and Intolerance in Sixteenth-Century Germany', in O. P. Grell and B. Scribner (eds.), *Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 32–47.

in particular to the French Wars of Religion. It is now apparent that they were in the fullest sense holy wars, in which the actual violence perpetrated was regarded as sacred. Atrocities were committed by both sides during the Hussite wars and in the course of the perennial conflict waged on the Christian–Ottoman frontier in the Balkans, but they do not appear to have matched the intensity which was so striking a feature of the wars fought between Huguenots and Catholics in France.[52] This process of 'Putting Religion back into the Wars of Religion'[53] raises major questions, particularly in the light of the old view that warfare in the fifteenth century was largely emptied of any religious content. As we have seen in the discussion of Michael Walzer's article on Exodus 32: 26–8, there was no need for Europeans faced with this crisis in their religious affairs to 'reinvent the wheel' because leaders like John Calvin possessed the exegetical ability simply to revive a former interpretation of crucial scriptural texts and to strengthen it as they needed. And as David Martin showed, the very nature of Christianity's historical evolution played into their hands. But the question still arises as to whether they were breaking with a period in which religious warfare had been largely superseded, or whether Calvinists and Counter-Reformation Catholics were simply intensifying practices and sharpening modes of thinking which had never gone away. We shall see in the Conclusion that institutional continuities between the Crusades and the Wars of Religion can be located. That is interesting enough, and in the light of these recent historiographical trends it is not surprising. But the question is whether the continuity resides in more than the occasional direct borrowing or institutional resurrection. It is clear that with certain notable exceptions crusading exerted only a fraction of its former mass appeal by the early sixteenth century. But the existence of religious warfare in a broader sense raises profound questions. Was there ever a time between 1095 and 1648 when European society was free of religious warfare? Or do we have to accept that for more than half a millennium European Christians fought at least some of their wars in God's name?

1.2 THE CONTEXTS OF CONFLICT, *C.*1300–1536

It is important to start with the context, by surveying the range of key areas in which religion and warfare displayed a tendency to converge, and the circumstances in which that convergence became so marked that religious warfare resulted. The most natural place to begin is the range of borders where religious difference combined with disputes of a territorial or similar character to produce

[52] Though see below, Ch. 5.1, on the reputation of the Turks for cruelty, and note C. Heywood, 'The Frontier in Ottoman History: Old Ideas and New Myths', in D. Power and N. Standen (eds.), *Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700–1700* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 228–50, at 238–40.

[53] The title of a review article by Mack P. Holt: *French Historical Studies*, 18 (1993), 524–51. See also his *French Wars of Religion*, 3, 190–1.

belligerence.[54] The Mamluk conquest of the Holy Land in 1291 removed the most obvious such border, but others were by no means lacking in the late Middle Ages. In the eastern Mediterranean itself the rise of the Turkish Anatolian *beyliks*, especially those situated along the coast and exerting themselves in naval terms, brought a condition of sporadic warfare to the world of the Aegean sea lanes and the fragmented Catholic powers of the region. At the other end of the Mediterranean, the Nasrid emirate of Granada, the last remaining Islamic enclave in Iberia, shared a long border with the kingdom of Castile until the campaigns of Fernando and Isabella in 1482–92, which finally ended Muslim power in the peninsula. And in north-eastern Europe a vicious war persisted throughout almost the entire fourteenth century between the Teutonic Knights in Prussia and Livonia and their pagan neighbours in Lithuania.[55]

In the fifteenth century the situation changed dramatically in two respects. In the east, the rise of the Ottomans and their advance into the Balkans brought into being the first major land frontier between Christian and Muslim powers outside Iberia since the time of the crusader states in Palestine and Syria. The Catholic kingdom of Hungary was forced to maintain a militarized frontier in the south from the failure of Sultan Mehmed II to capture Belgrade in 1456, through to the fall of that city in 1521 and the disaster which ensued at Mohács in 1526. After these events the frontier moved northwards into Croatia and the Hungarian plain. This was the most significant border between faiths in the entire period. By contrast, the border in the Baltic region effectively vanished once Lithuania had been opened up for conversion in 1386. Hostilities with the Orthodox Russian principalities further east were not pursued with the consistency or brutality which had characterized the Teutonic Order's conflict with the Lithuanians.[56]

What, if any, generalizations may be made about a scenario with so many variations? By their very nature frontier relations highlight the problem of disentangling motives which was referred to earlier. Were wars waged over faith or over land, tribute, or booty? Did such conflicts break out because of underlying mistrust based on a negative perception of 'the infidel', or because of circumstances, such as thrusting ambition on one side or the simple breakdown of peace-keeping mechanisms? Several broad points can be made on the basis of research into the border zones outlined above. The first is that border societies proved able to accommodate dichotomies which in the past historians have tended to insist were irreconcilable. Religious warfare and *convivencia*, rejection and assimilation, were woven together into a composite social and cultural pattern. This

[54] See also my 'Frontier Societies and Crusading in the Late Middle Ages', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 10 (1995), 104–19, repr. in *CWMRE*, study V.

[55] See relevant chapters in M. Jones (ed.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vi: *c.1300–c.1415* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[56] Again, *The New Cambridge Medieval History* provides full treatment of all these areas. See C. Allmand (ed.), vol. vii: *c.1415–c.1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

could produce a town like Dalmatian Senj, a pirate ('uskok') community which grew rapidly in the turmoil following Mohács, and came to form a vital link in the Croatian military frontier established by the Habsburgs. As Wendy Bracewell has shown, Senj embraced the paradox in full.[57] Although they never benefited from crusade privileges, the uskoks conducted their war against the Turks as a continual struggle in defence of the faith. In their own eyes they manned an *antemurale*, a bulwark or rampart of Christendom. The local clergy encouraged this viewpoint, blessing weapons, preaching exhortatory sermons, and displaying uskok standards and trophies in their churches. On one notable occasion the bishop of Senj actually took part in a campaign. 'This was a crusading creed, with military elements inextricably incorporated into religious life.'[58] It is telling that uskok activities were viewed as warfare on behalf of the faith even by Christian communities living under Ottoman rule and suffering, directly or indirectly, at the hands of the raiders, as well as by Dalmatian subjects of Venice who also incurred heavy losses from their attacks.[59]

The uskok view that war with Islam was natural and inevitable was far from unusual: it was shared, for example, by their eminent contemporary Francisco de Vitoria, the Salamanca legal commentator. Referring to Deuteronomy 20: 10–14, the terms of surrender which the Israelites were to offer to the inhabitants of any town which they besieged, Vitoria argued that 'in wars against the infidel . . . peace can never be hoped for on any terms; therefore the only remedy is to eliminate all of them who are capable of bearing arms against us, given that they are already guilty'. All captured infidel combatants should thus be killed and their women and children enslaved.[60] What is more striking is that the same Turks who as an enemy were demonized by the uskoks and their priests duelled with them on occasion in chivalric style,[61] celebrated common ties of kinship, and forged pacts of blood brotherhood (*pobratimstvo*) with individual uskoks. Turkish border raiders (*martoloses*) who defected to the Christians were welcomed into the uskok ranks once they had been baptized. Both sides embraced a common code of honour, a shared quest for renown, and a dread of shame. Most importantly, the need for booty to sustain Senj's economy was balanced by a mutual recognition that all-out war was in nobody's interests. 'The fundamental force that modified the inflexible opposition between uskok and Muslim implied by the ideal of holy war was that of local self-interest—whether it was primarily

[57] C. W. Bracewell, *The Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry, and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century Adriatic* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), esp. chs. 6–7.

[58] Ibid. 159. [59] Ibid. 218–19.

[60] Francisco de Vitoria, 'On the Law of War', in *Political Writings*, ed. and trans. A. Pagden and J. Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 293–327, at 315, 318, 321.

[61] Duelling, which is antagonistic but depends on shared cultural values, epitomizes the paradox of rejection/assimilation. The fame earned by the leader of the Hungarian peasant crusade of 1514, György Dózsa, by killing a prominent Turkish opponent in a duel in February 1514 helped establish his eligibility to lead the crusade: M. D. Birnbaum, 'A Mock Calvary in 1514? The Dózsa-Passion', in G. E. Szönyi (ed.), *European Iconography East and West* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 91–108, at 93.

economic, as in the case of ransom agreements, or whether it rose more generally from a desire for a quieter life.'[62] The strength of Bracewell's interpretation resides in the fact that her appreciation of this pragmatic bedrock does not lead her to the viewpoint held by previous scholars that 'the uskoks' raiding activities were essentially devoid of ideological objectives'.[63]

One could say much more about Senj, but most of the evidence that Bracewell uses dates from the later sixteenth century and it therefore falls outside the scope of this book. In its broad outlines, however, there is little discrepancy between this portrait of relations between the faiths on the Dalmatian frontier, and the picture that has emerged of late of the border between Castile and Granada in the period leading up to 1482. Here too there existed an ideology of religious warfare, not that of *antemurale* but rather of pledged and overdue *Reconquista*. Yet there is evidence in plenty for both *convivencia* and acculturation, as well as mechanisms for moderating the inevitable outbreaks of hostility and for settling disputes peacefully. It is striking that in both cases the principle of 'good neighbourly behaviour' was referred to in the maintenance of peace.[64] Where the Senj model seems to break down is the frontier between Prussia and Lithuania, where the elements of contact, respect, and borrowing were fewer, and evidence for dehumanization and brutality more abundant. But even here, it has recently been shown, there were both intentions and means of controlling a violence which was mutually disadvantageous. Each side treated the other with grudging respect.[65]

In a sense, then, these frontiers display a collective application of what we might term the 'Henry the Navigator syndrome': a mixture of what seem to be irreconcilable ways of viewing and dealing with the enemy. We are naturally led to ask what circumstances on the Christian side could cause religious war to dominate. One such was clearly the relationship between the frontier and the 'interior'. At Senj, for example, the *antemurale* image was valuable in contesting incessant Venetian hostility to the uskoks' disruptive activities. The Venetians viewed the uskoks as no more than pirates: legally and politically it was useful to assert that they were, on the contrary, soldiers posted on one of Christendom's most exposed bulwarks. This sounds manipulative, but that would be to misread the subtle interplay of ideas which was occurring. The uskoks liked and promoted the idea that they were fighting a religious war; the papal court and the Habsburg authorities alike moulded this into dominant images such as the

[62] Bracewell, *Uskoks*, 182.

[63] P. Longworth, 'The Senj Uskoks Reconsidered', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 57 (1979), 348–68, at 365.

[64] Bracewell, *Uskoks*, 34; A. MacKay, 'The Ballad and the Frontier in Late Mediaeval Spain', *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies*, 53 (1976), 15–33, at 26–7.

[65] S. C. Rowell, *Lithuania Ascending: A Pagan Empire within East-Central Europe, 1295–1345* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), *passim*, esp. 261, 296; R. Mažeika, 'Of Cabbages and Knights: Trade and Trade Treaties with the Infidel on the Northern Frontier', *JMH* 20 (1994), 63–76.

propugnaculum adversus infideles, and the *antemurale Christianitatis*; and these images were in turn expounded to the uskoks by the resident lower clergy, enhancing their self-esteem and consolidating their group image.[66]

In the case of Granada, there was clearly a shifting relationship between the frontier authorities and communities on the one hand, and the Castilian crown and papacy on the other, based on perceptions of responsibilities and the control of resources. The adroit use of *Reconquista* ideology could secure valuable royal attention and money for what were at root regional needs, especially if the papacy could also be persuaded to grant crusading bulls. Prominent representatives of the frontier regions did not lack sophistication when it came to appealing for financial help. In 1471, for instance, the constable of Castile Miguel Lucas de Iranzo, writing to the pope on behalf of the frontier lands where he had established his own power-base, deployed language which would not have shamed a crusading oration by a contemporary Italian humanist: 'since for our part we are contributing all our possessions, our women, our children, our relatives, our freedom, our country, and in the end our very lives, other Christians should at least contribute a little money for the most sacred protection not of one individual, but of Christendom itself.'[67] On the other hand, too much outside attention, be it papal or royal, was unwelcome in a region which was used to looking after itself, especially if it was associated with the erosion of *convivencia* within the nation's religious culture, as it was in the period of the Fernandine conquest.[68]

The overall attitude of the 'political centre' therefore mattered greatly. Two contrasting examples will illustrate this. Before the emergence of the Ottoman Turks the initiative on the Latin side in the Aegean world (*Romania*) lay to a large extent with Venice. The city normally had much more to gain from trade and diplomacy than from belligerence. This was probably one important reason why the pronounced tendency towards *jihad* among the Anatolian *beyliks* did not have the effect of establishing an ethos of religious warfare in the region.[69] The main exception was formed by the series of Holy Leagues which were organized from 1334 onwards. Venice was as keen as anybody on gaining crusading privileges for these naval leagues but did not seek to go any further.[70] In much the same way, the republic had a good command of the rhetoric of crusade when it was forced into war with the Ottomans in the fifteenth century, but it was invariably sparing and

[66] Bracewell, *Uskoks*, 172. We shall return to this theme below, Ch. 4.3.

[67] *Hechos del condestable don Miguel Lucas de Iranzo (Crónica del siglo XV)*, ed. J. de M. Carriazo (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1940), 475.

[68] T. F. Ruiz, 'Elite and Popular Culture in Late Fifteenth-Century Castilian Festivals: The Case of Jaen', in B. A. Hanawalt and K. L. Reyerson (eds.), *City and Spectacle in Medieval Europe* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 296–318.

[69] E. A. Zachariadou, 'Holy War in the Aegean during the Fourteenth Century', in B. Arbel, B. Hamilton, and D. Jacoby (eds.), *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London: Frank Cass, 1989), 212–25.

[70] Housley, *Later Crusades*, ch. 2 *passim*.

selective in the use which it made of it.[71] On the other hand, the Teutonic Knights missed no opportunity to accentuate their view that the struggle with the Lithuanians constituted a war on behalf of the faith. This was in line with the Order's history: it had always been bellicose in its approach towards paganism.[72] In both cases, of course, the attitude adopted sprang also from the nature of the frontier and the actual causes of conflict: but some formative role must be attributed to the traditions of the dominant political power and the *modus operandi* which its elite found most congenial.

One important reason why the Teutonic Knights took the uncompromising line they did on Lithuania was their hope of attracting volunteers for their war. Service at one or more of Christendom's *frontes guerrarum paganorum*, as *crucesignatus*, mercenary, or simple guest, was a central constituent of chivalric practice in the late Middle Ages. It has received a lot of attention in recent years, most impressively in the case of the *Preussenreisen*, the annual pattern of raids and full-scale campaigns into Lithuania which were organized by the Teutonic Order between about 1300 and 1413.[73] The *Reisen* were unique, and no other frontier managed to attract so many volunteers, a fair number of them repeatedly, over such a long stretch of time. Volunteers did make their way to Granada and Hospitaller Rhodes in the fourteenth century, and to Hungary and Rhodes in the fifteenth. Cyprus too was a popular venue, although it can rarely have offered the opportunity for fighting. Typically, military activity on these borders was combined with pilgrimage and sight-seeing, and in some cases with spying, diplomacy, and sexual adventures. The pattern continued, albeit much diminished, into the sixteenth century, when some volunteers fought for the Knights of St John at the siege of Malta in 1565.

This broad range of adventurous, essentially opportunistic combat raises interpretative problems which are not dissimilar to those thrown up by the warfare waged by the frontier communities which in most cases hosted the volunteers. This applies for example to the question of motivation: even sources written from a standpoint favourable to the Teutonic Order do not deny that volunteers went to Prussia to gain honour and fame as well as to 'spread Christianity' or 'defend the faith', and Werner Paravicini has described in rich detail the range of incentives put in place by the Teutonic Knights to make their guests' stay at Königsberg an enjoyable one.[74] But *au fond* it was the lure of fighting

[71] Setton, *PL* ii. 163–4, 367, 441; P. Preto, *Venezia e i Turci* (Florence: Sansoni, 1975), 25–51.

[72] This emerged most clearly during the polemical dispute between the Order and Poland at the council of Constance. See, e.g., F. H. Russell, 'Paulus Vladimiri's Attack on the Just War: A Case Study in Legal Polemics', in B. Tierney and P. Linehan (eds.), *Authority and Power: Studies on Medieval Law and Government Presented to Walter Ullmann on his Seventieth Birthday* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 237–54.

[73] The definitive study is W. Paravicini, *Die Preussenreisen des europäischen Adels*, 3 vols. (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke, 1989 ff.). See also Rowell, *Lithuania Ascending*, and 'Baltic Europe', in Jones (ed.), *New Cambridge Medieval History*, vi. 699–734.

[74] Paravicini, *Die Preussenreisen*, i. 288–310.

pagani which attracted these men, and when the Lithuanians ceased being pagan the practice ended, at least once it became impracticable for the Order to conjure that unpalatable fact away any longer. Nowhere is the link between chivalry and warring against non-believers clearer than in the pre-eminence of being dubbed on such battlefields. Zurara, Henry the Navigator's biographer, imagined the prince anxiously reflecting at the taking of Ceuta in 1415 that he needed to kill some Moors: 'And for what glory will they be able to praise me on the day when I am made knight, if my sword has not been dipped to the hilt in the blood of the Infidels?'[75]

Like the uskoks, Henry (and Zurara) believed that 'the Infidels are our enemies by nature',[76] a viewpoint which was axiomatic among such chivalric enthusiasts. Yet it did not lead such men consistently to demonize their opponents to the extent of shunning their company. In this respect their ambivalence towards the enemy mirrored the attitudes of their host communities. In the case of the volunteers this was exemplified by Jean II le Maingre, better known as Boucicaut, who was appointed marshal of France in 1391. His reputation for seeking out combat against 'the Saracens' wherever and whenever he could was second to none. In one remarkable incident in 1403, when campaigning in Cyprus and facing a period of enforced idleness, Boucicaut looked around for an unbeliever to attack: 'he sought the advice of the knights of the land and the Genoese as to where they thought he might most conveniently carry out *une rese* against the enemies of the faith.'[77] This implacable antagonism towards unbelievers did not lead him to avoid their company. In the course of a lengthy perambulation of the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean in 1388–9 Boucicaut enjoyed a stay of several weeks' duration at the court of Murad I: he even offered his services should the Ottoman sultan take the field against other Muslims.[78] But this did not make Boucicaut any less serious in his motivation when he took up arms against Murad's son Bayezid eight years later on the Nicopolis expedition.[79]

As is now commonplace, chivalry in the late Middle Ages was expressed in ways which to us appear incongruous, even eccentric. This can induce a scepticism which distorts our understanding, as occurred, notoriously, in Johan Huizinga's case.[80] This can be as misleading as the questioning of motivation discussed earlier, not least in respect of the association between chivalric endeavour and religious belief. It is hard not to be amused when reading that the Teutonic Order's famed Table of Honour (*Ehrentisch*) was set up in enemy territory in

[75] Gomes Eannes de Zurara, *Conquests and Discoveries of Henry the Navigator*, ed. V. de Castro e Almeida, trans. B. Miall (London: Allen & Unwin, 1936), 106.

[76] Ibid. 41.

[77] *Le Livre des fais du bon messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut, mareschal de France et gouverneur de Jennes*, ed. D. Lalande (Paris: Droz, 1985), 221.

[78] Ibid. 61–2. [79] Ibid. 88–91.

[80] M. Keen, 'Huizinga, Kilgour and the Decline of Chivalry', *Medievalia et humanistica*, NS 8 (1977), 1–20.

1391, so that the Order's guests had to sit down to eat in armour for fear of enemy attack.[81] Incongruity easily generates suspicion of hypocrisy when Zurara informs us that Portuguese squires charged almost naked Africans wearing full armour and shouting 'Portugal and St James', 'for all the world as if they were about to engage the seasoned warriors of the armies of Morocco or Granada'.[82] But Peter Russell was right to warn us that in this instance such scepticism is an impediment to understanding either the motivation or the spirit in which the Portuguese discoveries and conquests were undertaken. Like the *Reisen*, these wars were shaped by religious belief; they fed on traditions of crusade and chivalry which remained highly attractive to contemporaries, irrespective of the other factors involved. And it was the genius of Henry the Navigator to tap into these traditions as a means of motivating his youthful assistants in their demanding task.[83]

The occasion and parameters for religious warfare at the frontiers of Christian Europe were provided by the existence and activities of an unbelieving enemy. The greatest threat to it lay not in *convivencia*, which could alternate with it without seriously damaging it, but in conversion, which fundamentally changed cross-border relations as well as putting paid to the flow of volunteers from the 'interior'. Behind labels like 'enemies of the cross' (*inimici crucis*) and 'the common foe of Christendom' ('enemigo común de la Cristianidad')[84] lay a concept of a Christian republic which could have bulwarks to be defended. Throughout the late Middle Ages, and especially after the Great Schism of 1378–1417, a strong sense prevailed of the inherent fragility of Catholic unity, of the danger of internal fissure being just as great as that of external assault. In July 1421, for example, King Sigismund of Hungary wrote to Cardinal Branda, who was organizing a new crusade against the Hussites, that he had not worked hard to reunite the church only to let the Hussites tear it apart again; and that there would be little point in staving off infidel Turkish attacks on Hungary only to lose Bohemia to heretics.[85]

This spatial republic had its temporal equivalent in the church militant, stretching through time and subject to the plans of God in the same way that the *respublica christiana* was subject to the *magisterium* of the papacy. Contemporary concern with eschatology, the constant unrolling of sacred history, provided a motor for religious war which was just as powerful as the defence of Christendom, and arguably more so.[86] The importance of eschatological

[81] Paravicini, *Die Preussenreisen*, i. 318. [82] Russell, *Prince Henry*, 200.

[83] Ibid. 238, 363–4.

[84] See, e.g., J. Sánchez Montes, *Franceses, Protestantes, Turcos: Los Españoles ante la política internacional de Carlos V* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1951), 101 n. 133.

[85] *UB* i, no. 127.

[86] For further exploration of some of the points made here see my study 'The Eschatological Imperative: Messianism and Holy War in Europe, 1260–1556', in P. Schäfer and M. R. Cohen (eds.), *Toward the Millennium: Messianic Expectations from the Bible to Waco* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 123–50, repr. in *CWMRE*, study III.

awareness, focused on expectations of an imminent apocalypse, in the late Middle Ages and Early Modern period is now a recognized fact.[87] Indeed there have been few more radical shifts in recent years than historians' acceptance of just how constant and widespread were contemporaries' anxious attempts to 'read' the future in terms of Christ's Second Coming and his millennial rule. Jerome's famous 'curse' on millenarian speculation, and Augustine's interpretation of Revelation 20 as referring to the contemporary church, had long been abandoned; instead contemporaries engaged in repeated attempts to use the seductive figures and imagery found in books like Revelation, Daniel, and Isaiah to establish when the great drama of the Last Days would begin.[88]

The most important figure by far in this respect was Abbot Joachim of Fiore (*c.*1135–1202). It is hard to dispute the judgement of one leading commentator that 'The abbot of Fiore surely stood for a turning point in the history of European attitudes toward the future.'[89] Joachim's influence on apocalyptic thinking, and in particular on millenarian or chiliastic expectations, sprang from his division of human history into three stages (*status*), of which the third would be the millennial one, and from his pinpointing of the sixth age (*etas*) in the second *status* as the one in which the tribulations would take place which Revelation had long caused Christians to see as an essential preliminary to Christ's return.[90] From the early thirteenth century right through to the seventeenth, generation after generation of Joachites attempted to historicize the Last Days. The Book of Revelation provided them with some of the actors for this cosmic drama, including Antichrist, Gog, and Magog; while early Joachimist texts added some remarkable figures, notably an Angelic Pope (*pastor angelicus*) and a messianic Last Emperor. Together they made up an impressive list of dramatis personae.[91]

Apocalyptic thinking has normally adopted a pattern of crisis-judgement-vindication.[92] This was powerfully reinforced by the nature of the times, so the Joachimist agenda was bound to be one of war and revolution. The loss of the Holy Land, where the final defeat of Antichrist was to occur and Christ would return to his people, posed a dilemma which could only be solved by

[87] For example, it was one of three 'major themes' at the 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences held at Oslo in 2000: see A. Jolstad and M. Lunde (eds.), *Proceedings, 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences* (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2000), 53–81. For a short recent review see R. Rusconi, 'L'escatologia negli ultimi secoli del Medioevo', in A. Patschovsky and F. Šmahel (eds.), *Eschatologie und Hussitismus* (Prague: Historisches Institut, 1996), 7–24.

[88] R. E. Lerner, 'The Medieval Return to the Thousand-Year Sabbath', in Emmerson and McGinn (eds.), *Apocalypse*, 51–71.

[89] Ibid. 58.

[90] M. Reeves, 'The Originality and Influence of Joachim of Fiore', *Traditio*, 36 (1980), 269–316, forms the best introduction to this.

[91] The fundamental work remains M. Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages: A Study in Joachimism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[92] B. McGinn (ed.), *Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. xvi–xvii. The new edn. of this invaluable collection of texts contains an updated bibliography.

incorporating within the programme of future events a great crusade to recover Jerusalem. Here the gentiles would be converted before Christ returned, fulfilling John 10: 16: 'So there will be one flock, one shepherd.' In this context it was difficult not to refer to actual crusade plans, and the Franciscan Jean de Roquetaillade (Johannes de Rupescissa), perhaps the fourteenth century's most original Joachite, conceived of his crusade in terms which strongly resemble what had recently been proposed.[93] More broadly, the triumphs achieved by Islam through both Mamluks and Ottomans forced Joachites to take full cognizance of these two powers. On the other hand, the lamentable condition of both the church and society at large made a deep-cutting process of internal purgation as fully a part of these prophetic expectations as the final triumph of the faith. To give a single example, in 1461 the German Carthusian Dionysius Ryckel wrote off the whole of the hierarchy, religious and secular, as irremediably oppressive and experienced visions of its severe chastisement at the hands of the Turks.[94] Chastisement and triumphalism, the church's near-destruction and its final success, formed twin poles for the apocalyptic electricity of Joachimism. Thus the pope could be viewed as *pastor angelicus* or as Antichrist; while the city of Rome, seat of both the papacy's *magisterium* and its much-criticized bureaucracy, was viewed in extraordinarily ambivalent ways, some seeing it as the New Jerusalem, others as a Babylon, whose total destruction was preordained and essential for the renewal of the true faith.[95]

Granted that violence in pursuit of God's ordained programme of events was inevitable, and that the timetable involved might be foretold with some accuracy, were such prophecies descriptive or prescriptive? There was obviously a big difference between working out that a particular ruler or pope was the Last Emperor or the *pastor angelicus*, of whom great things could be expected, and urging him on that basis to set an actual war in motion. A leading scholar of the subject, Robert Lerner, has argued powerfully that prophecies were normally consolatory rather than exhortatory. Lerner demonstrated how interpretation of one particular prophecy, that of the cedar of Lebanon, changed in the late Middle Ages. This was a good example of non-scriptural prophecy, its popularity residing partly in the fact that it contained something for virtually everyone: during the 1520s both Catholics and Lutherans found in the prophecy a reassuring response to the crises they both faced. Towards the end of a scholarly *tour de*

[93] Johannes de Rupescissa, *Liber secretorum eventuum*, ed. C. Morerod-Fattebert with an introduction by R. E. Lerner (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1994), 167–8.

[94] C. Göllner, *Turcica*, 3 vols. (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1961–78), iii. 334–5.

[95] B. McGinn, 'Angel Pope and Papal Antichrist', *Church History*, 47 (1978), 155–73; M. Reeves (ed.), *Prophetic Rome in the High Renaissance Period* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Milhou, *Colón*, 292–3, 328, 414–15; J. W. O'Malley, *Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform: A Study in Renaissance Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 1968), 122–6, 133–5; id., *Praise and Blame in Renaissance Rome: Rhetoric, Doctrine and Reform in the Sacred Orators of the Papal Court, c.1450–1521* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), 207 ff.

force which was not dissimilar to Walzer's analysis of the changing exegesis of Exodus 32, Lerner commented that 'Medieval chiliastic prophecies could, and usually did, have subversive implications, but such prophecies were rarely issued to encourage subversion . . . Medieval eschatological prophets hardly wrote as reformers or revolutionaries; their aim was to comprehend and make known God's plan without thinking that they or others could do anything to change it. Although they did not hesitate to express their prejudices and resentments, they did not mean to call for any human action other than "vigilance" and perseverance in Christian rectitude.'[96]

There are strong reasons to take issue with Lerner's view that eschatologists thought and behaved in this essentially fatalistic spirit. In general, there is the sheer popularity of this literature at all levels of society: Cola di Rienzo commented on this that 'if the prophecies of Merlin, Methodius, Policarp, Joachim and Cyril are the products of impure spirits or mere inventions, why are the church's pastors and prelates so willing to give them space in their libraries, in copies beautifully bound in silver?'[97] Taking this argument a stage further, it is hard to accept that such fascination was passive, rather than springing from the belief that human action would be legitimized and mobilized by the ability to 'read' God's will for his creation. There seems to be more inherent plausibility in Bernard McGinn's characterization of apocalypticism as 'a political rhetoric and a way of giving meaning to the world that has empowered individuals and groups to action'.[98] This is clearest in the case of prophecy and crusade. For example, a Joachimist prophecy about the imminent destruction of the Ottoman sultanate was used to counter defeatism in 1456, and stimulated recruitment for the crusade at Augsburg, Nürnberg, and Speyer.[99] And in the early sixteenth century Cardinal Bernardino López de Carvajal tried to use prophecy as a lever for action against the Turkish advance.[100]

Above all, the link between prophecy and crusade was emphasized when it came to calls for the recovery of Jerusalem. To a large extent this was because of the city's central place within apocalyptic thinking, but it was also due to the highly problematic nature of a recovery crusade as a military undertaking: it called for the mobilization of every argument which might help. Thus Giles of Viterbo, perhaps the best example in our period of a Joachite who was well placed to shape events, spoke in December 1507 of God's 'calling' to Pope Julius II through prophecies as well as current events to initiate a great crusade to win

[96] R. E. Lerner, *The Powers of Prophecy: The Cedar of Lebanon Vision from the Mongol Onslaught to the Dawn of the Enlightenment* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 195–6.

[97] Johannes de Rupescissa, *Liber secretorum eventuum*, introd. 83.

[98] McGinn (ed.), *Visions of the End*, p. xix. Cf. L. Polizzotto, *The Elect Nation: The Savonarolan Movement in Florence 1494–1545* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 205: 'in the context of apocalyptic expectations, some degree of consciously hortatory prophecy was inevitable.'

[99] Göllner, *Turcica*, iii. 335.

[100] N. H. Minnich, 'The Role of Prophecy in the Career of the Enigmatic Bernardino López de Carvajal', in Reeves (ed.), *Prophetic Rome*, 111–20; O'Malley, *Praise and Blame*, 235 n. 164.

back Jerusalem: 'Therefore act now, most blessed father. Behold with what voices, with what prophecies, with what noble deeds God calls on you.' Like Christopher Columbus, Giles placed much emphasis on the authority of Isaiah, whose chapter 60 seemed to link overseas discovery clearly with the recovery of Jerusalem.[101]

Even when urgency was much less apparent, prophecy was a handy argument to push a debate forward. A telling example from the very end of the period is Christopher St German's interpretation of Revelation 13: 18 to predict the imminent end of Islam and call for a crusade, in his *Salem and Bizance* (1533). This was not a Joachimist prophecy but a simple reading of the arithmetic in the verse, which famously runs: 'let anyone with understanding calculate the number of the beast, for it is the number of a person.' It was believed that Adam ('a person') had lived for 930 years, which was almost the same as the time which had passed since the birth of Muhammad (1533 minus 596 = 937 years). So the time had come for Islam, 'the beast', to end its reign. But for that actually to happen, St German noted, there must be an upsurge of enthusiasm for a crusade within the hearts of ordinary people, as in the past. If such an upsurge were to occur, as the author clearly hoped that it would, 'throughe grace', Scripture gave hope for the conversion of the infidels. 'And if there come such a desire in the hertes of the people: it were not vnlyke, but that they shulde haue the desire of theyr herte fulfilled, though other, whiche before them hadde lyke desire, had it not fulfilled, for the tyme was not yet come.' But 'I speake them not as prophecies, but as thynges, that as me semethe by reason of the sayde exposition, and by dyuers reasonable coniectures, are lykely to ensewe'.[102]

There is a second difficulty in assessing the impact of prophecy. Even if influence on events was aspired to by men like Giles of Viterbo, was it actually achieved? Marjorie Reeves, the pioneer of Joachimist studies in England, was well aware that 'the history of prophecy contains the delicate problem of the interplay between word and action',[103] in part because of the opposition which her advocacy of this largely new field of study encountered from historians belonging to the Gradgrind school. Reeves herself showed, and others have confirmed, that such an interplay did take place. When a particular policy had to be lobbied for, or to be 'sold' to a broader public, arguments based on eschato-

[101] 'Fulfillment of the Christian Golden Age under Pope Julius II: Text of a Discourse of Giles of Viterbo, 1507', ed. J. W. O'Malley, *Traditio*, 25 (1969), 265–338, repr. in *Rome and the Renaissance: Studies in Culture and Religion* (London: Variorum, 1981), study V, at 337; Milhou, *Colón*, 132–3. On Giles and the promotion of action see O'Malley, *Giles of Viterbo*, 181 ff.

[102] Christopher St German, 'Salem and Bizance', in *CWSTM* x, ed. J. Guy et al. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 323–92, at 384–7. There was a vogue for prophecies of an imminent crusade in England at this time: see A. Fox, 'Prophecies and Politics in the Reign of Henry VIII', in A. Fox and J. Guy (eds.), *Reassessing the Henrician Age: Humanism, Politics and Reform 1500–1550* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 77–94.

[103] Reeves, *Influence of Prophecy*, 135.

logical readings were frequently invoked. And this of course is part of the problem. One factor lying behind Reeves's concern to demonstrate clear links between prophetic programmes and policies is the suspicion that rulers were likely to use Joachimist ideas as camouflage for goals which were actually rooted in dynastic or material interests. We thus return to the central problem of motivation which we have already approached from several other directions. In this case, it is looking increasingly likely that the answer lies less in establishing clear cases of influence, as Reeves tried to do, than in building up a plausible picture of an encompassing political culture in which prophecy held its place alongside other driving concerns and forces. The latter approach seems the way forward, for example, in dealing with the two most important instances of 'official messianism' in our period, Charles VIII of France and the Emperor Charles V. Both rulers pursued policies of aggrandizement which were associated not just with crusading objectives but also with a powerful reservoir of eschatological expectation largely based on historicized Joachimist readings of the Last Days. Geoffrey Parker has recently demonstrated how well such an approach works in the case of Philip II of Spain.[104]

We are on different terrain when eschatological programmes were tied not to governments and their ambitions, but to religious challenge and insurrection. Even Lerner was willing to acknowledge that an 'eschatological imperative' existed in the case of millenarian revolutionaries, citing the outstanding example of Tabor.[105] Lerner himself showed how a text written by Jean de Roquetaillade, the *Vade mecum* of 1356, was rewritten in Bohemia in 1422 with emphasis on its most violent passages. 'What would Rupescissa, the disciple of pacific St Francis, have thought had he known that half a century after his death his writings would help harvest in a faraway land the vintage of the grapes of wrath?'[106] After Tabor's heyday there was no comparable example of insurgents embracing a millenarian programme until the early sixteenth century. In Valencia the *Germanías* revolt produced one such case at Játiva in 1522, but this was occasioned by the fact that Joachimist ideas had taken a uniquely subversive direction in Iberia.[107] Elsewhere, social revolts were not distinguished by millenarian hopes, even when (as in Hungary in 1514) they took the form of religious wars for other reasons. Instead, apocalyptic thinking found a new outlet in the sectarian violence of the early Reformation period, most spectacularly in the Anabaptist seizure of power at Münster in 1534–5.

104 'Tudor England in the Messianic Vision of Philip II of Spain': Prothero Lecture of the Royal Historical Society, 2001. I am grateful to Prof. Parker for sending me the full text of his lecture.

105 Lerner, *Powers of Prophecy*, 195 n. 17.

106 R. E. Lerner, '"Popular Justice": Rupescissa in Hussite Bohemia', in Patschovsky and Šmahel (eds.), *Eschatologie und Hussitismus*, 39–51, quote at 49.

107 S. T. Nalle, 'The Millennial Moment: Revolution and Radical Religion in Sixteenth-Century Spain', in Schäfer and Cohen (eds.), *Toward the Millennium*, 151–71.

The last area in which religious warfare found expression was that of national conflicts.[108] While the importance of eschatological preoccupations in this period is now generally accepted, the same cannot be said of the influence of national feeling. Traditionally, historians have detected a growth of national sentiment in the late Middle Ages, most frequently under the impact of war and its many demands. The Hundred Years War has long been the classic example.[109] Some, however, continue to be uneasy about such a generalization, perhaps above all about its political implications. They argue that the increasing consciousness of ethnic difference, expressed in references to national characteristics which had long become stereotypical, and the strident appeals to national solidarity issued by rulers, were separate trends of a cultural and political nature: they did not produce a 'middle ground' in which a community which was united ethnically, linguistically, and in certain cultural respects also felt itself to be a 'nation'. John Hale was an eloquent representative of this sceptical school of thought. 'The sentiment of nationhood was slow to evolve because it only rang true within a country as a whole at exceptional moments of danger from outside threats. Even then . . . rallying calls from the centre faded to whispers and eventually to silence as they slowly passed along unmade roads into regions with their own forms of speech and patterns of local loyalties.'[110] One recent advance lies in the perception that this is far from being an 'either/or' issue. Old views of a universal Christian community which by 1500 had fragmented into 'national' units are based on far too simplistic an analysis of how loyalties, either individual or collective, actually operated. Similarly, it is ingenuous to expect that feelings of national cohesiveness could ever be dissociated from the extraordinary growth of governmental power and demands. Bernard Guenée's telling comment on the situation in France, 'l'état a créé la nation',[111] could be applied to many other countries.

For our present purpose, it is not necessary to establish that national feeling was omnipresent in the late Middle Ages, that it affected all social classes,[112] that it was 'organic' as opposed to a construct, or even that it took precedence over the many other ties and loyalties which characterized society. What is undoubtedly the case is that at times the wars which were fought by 'national

[108] See my '*Pro deo et patria mori*: Sanctified Patriotism in Europe, 1400–1600', in P. Contamine (ed.), *War and Competition between States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 221–48.

[109] See, e.g., C. Allmand, *Henry V* (London: Methuen, 1992), 404–25; more generally, R. Bean, 'War and the Birth of the Nation State', *Journal of Economic History*, 33 (1973), 203–21.

[110] J. Hale, *The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance* (London: Fontana, 1993), 68. For sustained arguments along the same lines see the studies by J. Szűcs, 'Die Nation', *passim*; ' "Nationalität" und "Nationalbewusstsein" in Mittelalter', in his *Nation und Geschichte*, 161–243.

[111] 'État et nation en France au moyen âge', *Revue historique*, 237 (1967), 17–30, at 27.

[112] In this respect the most important critique is by Ferenc Szakály, who has argued against the notion of peasant patriotism in Hungary: see his 'Das Bauerntum und die Kämpfe gegen die Türken bzw. gegen Habsburg in Ungarn im 16.–17. Jahrhundert', in G. Heckenast (ed.), *Aus der Geschichte der ostmitteleuropäischen Bauernbewegungen im 16.–17. Jahrhundert* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1977), 251–66.

communities', those states held together by an identity which went deeper than simple dynastic allegiance, were characterized by a heightened sense of emotional commitment which was expressed in religious terms. This phrasing looks like an evasion of the central issue, but the point is that as often as not the 'identity' at stake had a religious core. The reason has been well explained by Adrian Hastings in his study *The Construction of Nationhood*.[113] Hastings showed how religion played a decisive role in fashioning European nationhood, not least because of the attention paid by the church to the Old Testament. 'The whole concept of a 'Holy People', divinely chosen but enduring all the ups and downs of a confusing history, seems so very applicable to life nearer home.'[114] In this respect, he suggested, Christianity's embrace of the Hebrew scriptures had an effect which was not shared within Islam, where they did not enjoy the same status.[115]

Hastings was not alone in his perception of the important role played by Old Testament ideas in the way perceptions of nationhood were conceptualized. Donald Akenson commented that 'Every European nation at one time or another has had leaders or prophets who say that their country is chosen of God and is, in effect, the successor of the children of Israel, and that its citizens are living in a promised land.' Akenson, however, immediately qualified this remark by asserting that the concept rarely made any deep impact, notable exceptions being the three societies which he had singled out to study, namely Afrikaner South Africa, Israel, and Protestant Ulster.[116] Although Akenson himself did not say so, it might well be commented that none of these case studies was Catholic, and that a 'covenanting mentality', to borrow his phrase, could not take deep root in any country whose people owed allegiance to a universalist world-view. The fact is, however, that in the late Middle Ages it did, the result, as Adrian Hastings emphasized, being an ongoing tension between the exceptional and the universal, what Hastings termed 'a kind of focused universalism'.[117] The Catholic community was made up of individual peoples (*gentes*) which shaped their own religious identities around the special relationship which each believed itself to enjoy with God, while at the same time conscious of forming a part of the *respublica christiana*.

For obvious reasons, the tension was repeatedly on display in crusading history, perhaps above all in the period of crisis which followed the final loss of the Holy Land in 1291. For example, in his bull *Rex glorie* (1311), Pope Clement V walked a tightrope between Christian universalism and an acceptance of French exceptionalism: 'In the same way that the Israelites are known to have been granted the Lord's inheritance (*hereditas dominica*) by the choice of Heaven, to carry out the hidden wishes of God, so the kingdom of France has been selected as the Lord's special people, marked with the signs of honour, and chosen to

[113] Hastings, *Construction of Nationhood*, esp. ch. 8. [114] Ibid. 197. [115] Ibid. 201.
[116] Akenson, *God's Peoples*, 5. [117] Hastings, *Construction of Nationhood*, 98.

carry out God's commands.'[118] The tension can be illustrated too in attempts to promote emigration to the Holy Land. Shortly after the First Crusade, Fulcher of Chartres described the new kingdom of Jerusalem in terms akin to a 'melting pot society', a place where people forgot the identities they had enjoyed in the west. In contrast, some two centuries later Peter Dubois accepted that the new wave of settlers needed to repopulate the Holy Land, once it had been reconquered, would have to be given lands alongside their fellow-nationals, in order to prevent conflicts from breaking out.[119]

As we have seen, in *Rex glorie* Clement V came close to calling the kingdom of France the Holy Land in the west. Such an approach was fully in line with a broad-based tendency at the time to give France's crusading past pride of place in the evolving ideology of French kingship, a tendency which certainly brought rewards in terms of popular resonance but also entailed obligations which would weigh heavily on the shoulders of France's later kings.[120] After their initial wave of great successes in the Anglo-French war the English responded by staging a head-on challenge to their enemies' position: in Parliament in January 1377 Adam Houghton, Edward III's chancellor, asserted that military victory demonstrated that the English were God's Chosen People. It was their kingdom which was the true *heritage de Dieu*.[121] Six years later, when Bishop Henry Despenser led an English army to Flanders against the schismatic French troops who were garrisoning its towns, national pride and religious fervour briefly fused in a vigorous if crude assertion of English exceptionalism: as the archbishop of Canterbury, William Courtenay, commented in April 1383, 'the church cannot have peace without the realm, nor can the well-being of the realm be secured except through the church, and it is both meritorious to fight for the faith and fitting to fight for one's lord'. Despenser's expedition was legitimized as a crusade by the fact that it was launched in order to restore a Christian unity broken by the wilful wickedness of the enemy.[122] The tension between the exceptional and the universal could have found no better illustration.

[118] See my 'Holy Land or Holy Lands? Palestine and the Catholic West in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance', in R. N. Swanson (ed.), *The Holy Land, Holy Lands, and Christian History*, SCH 36 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000), 228–49, at 235.

[119] Ibid. 241.

[120] J. Strayer, 'France: The Holy Land, the Chosen People, and the Most Christian King', in T. K. Rabb and J. E. Seigel (eds.), *Action and Conviction in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of E. H. Harbison* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 3–16; C. Beaune, *The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France*, trans. S. R. Huston, ed. F. L. Cheyette (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), ch. 6; J. Krynen, *L'Empire du roi: Idées et croyances politiques en France XIIIe–Xve siècle* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), 345–83.

[121] *Rotuli parliamentorum*, 6 vols. (London, 1767–77), ii. 361–2. See also J. W. McKenna, 'How God Became an Englishman', in D. J. Guth and J. W. McKenna (eds.), *Tudor Rule and Revolution: Essays for G. R. Elton from his American Friends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 25–43, at 31–3; M. Wilks, 'Royal Patronage and Anti-Papalism from Ockham to Wyclif', in A. Hudson and M. Wilks (eds.), *From Ockham to Wyclif*, SCH, Subsidia 5 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 135–63, at 148–50.

[122] N. Housley, 'France, England, and the "National Crusade", 1302–1386', in G. Jondorf and D. N. Dumville (eds.), *France and the British Isles in the Middle Ages and Renaissance* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1991), 183–201, repr. in *CWMRE*, study VII, with quote at 196.

By about 1400 sacred *patria* and national exceptionalism had become the main reference points for the conduct of religious warfare on behalf of God and country.[123] It was not difficult to portray a war fought in defence of the *patria* as a conflict for a God-given political, social, and religious order, comprising the nation's church, its saints, its laws, and its very language. As Michael Wilks expressed it in the case of England, 'Just as the Israelite had seen his physical occupation of the land of the covenant as the guarantee of his entitlement to salvation, so the right-thinking Englishman of the later fourteenth century came to picture himself as a *piers plowman*, the tiller of the soil of a landed church, a co-worker with Christ in the green fields of England.'[124] As Wilks's words show, this image was deeply rooted in the Old Testament, expressing Akenson's 'covenanting mentality'. But Christological themes were bound to intrude. The feeling persisted that a Chosen People would have a broader mission on behalf of Christ's church, typically entailing either the defence of the faith or the spreading of the gospel. The former found its most characteristic expression in the application of *antemurale* ideology to an entire national community, which seemed justifiable in a period in which the spread of government and its escalating fiscal demands made it possible to visualize an entire people shouldering the burden of sustaining the bulwark.

The best examples are Poland and Hungary. Paul Knoll and Angelo Tamborra showed that the idea of Poland functioning as Christendom's bulwark-state was formed in the mid-fourteenth century in the context of the kingdom's ambitions in the east, then revived in the fifteenth in response to the advance of the Turks.[125] But *antemurale* thinking seems to have exerted more of an impact in Hungary. Descriptions of Hungary as a form of bulwark date from the period immediately following the battle of Nicopolis (1396), and it naturally burgeoned after the Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453 and the relief of Belgrade in 1456. These events impressed on the minds of Hungarians and of Catholics generally the role which the country played, the image of Hungarians manning a national *antemurale* effectively purging their negative image as the descendants of pagan barbarians. By the early sixteenth century the theme had become a commonplace, finding expression, for example, at the diet of Rákos in 1505 and in István Werböczy's compilation of Hungarian customary law, the *Tripartitum*, in 1517. It has been suggested that the *antemurale* image was so strongly embedded by this point that it far exceeded arguments based on patriotism in the exhortations made to garrison troops. But manning a bulwark was a form of exceptionalism: the disasters of the 1520s and 1530s were therefore interpreted in

[123] The classic study is E. H. Kantorowicz, '*Pro patria mori* in Medieval Political Thought', *AHR* 56 (1951), 472–92.

[124] Wilks, 'Royal Patronage', 151.

[125] P. Knoll, 'Poland as *Antemurale Christianitatis* in the Late Middle Ages', *Catholic Historical Review*, 60 (1974), 381–401; A. Tamborra, 'Problema turco e avamposto polacco fra Quattrocento e Cinquecento', in V. Branca and S. Graciotti (eds.), *Italia, Venezia e Polonia tra medio evo e età moderna* (Florence: Olschki, 1980), 531–49.

terms of the sins of the Hungarian people as a whole; the oppression of the peasantry by an exploitative yet negligent aristocracy was singled out as responsible by some commentators.[126] Once these had been purged by penance, the Hungarians would resume their rightful place as a Chosen People, who would expel the Turks from their *patria* and reconstitute the *antemurale* which their sinfulness had allowed the Turks to breach. János Varga summed up the whole sequence well: 'in this way sixteenth-century Hungary attained a consciousness of "exceptionalism", which was further fuelled by the bulwark-theme and provided the spiritual strength for the struggle against the Turks for another century.'[127]

Hungary in the sixteenth century thus entered a cycle of exceptionalism, catastrophic defeat, purgative penance, and renewal, which echoed the experience of medieval Castile in the *Reconquista*.[128] It is not surprising that the cycle mirrors the sequence usually predicted for apocalyptic events, since only a people purged of its sinfulness was fit to carry out God's eschatological plans. Castile itself exemplifies the alternative way of linking exceptionalism with the universalist theme, that of *dilatatio fidei*, the evangelization of pagan peoples by force of arms. And again, it is unsurprising that this beneficent triumphalism, a form of 'national messianism', was often portrayed in terms of the Joachimist programme, with its emphasis on the urgent need to realize John 10: 16 by bringing all the sheep into Christ's sheepfold.[129] It would become a dominant theme in Castilian national sentiment in the sixteenth century, in association with the defence of the Catholic faith from without and within.

Nothing better illustrates the way the twin poles of exceptionalism and universalism operated than the various migrations of Jerusalem. A sacred *patria* needed its own Jerusalem, and it is hardly surprising that on most occasions when the sanctification of the homeland took place, the association of its capital with Jerusalem was made. For example, Savonarola, the Ferrarese prophet and preacher who exercised control over Florence in 1494–8, proclaimed his adopted city to be a New Jerusalem, thereby adroitly associating Florentine civic patriotism (*campanilismo*) with his reforming zeal. But he also preached that the Florentines, once suitably purged of their sinfulness, would, like the Apostles, disseminate their message to the rest of the world, which would obligingly accept

[126] Göllner, *Turcica*, iii. 88.

[127] J. J. Varga, 'Europa und "Die Vormauer des Christentums". Die Entwicklungsgeschichte eines geflügelten Wortes', in B. Guthmüller and W. Kühlmann (eds.), *Europa und die Türken in der Renaissance* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2000), 55–63, with quote at 59. See also J. Jankovics, 'The Image of the Turks in Hungarian Renaissance Literature', ibid. 267–73; E. Fügedi, 'Two Kinds of Enemies—Two Kinds of Ideology: The Hungarian–Turkish Wars in the Fifteenth Century', in B. P. McGuire (ed.), *War and Peace in the Middle Ages* (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 1987), 146–60.

[128] P. Linehan, 'Religion, Nationalism and National Identity in Medieval Spain and Portugal', in S. Mews (ed.), *Religion and National Identity*, SCH 18 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), 161–99.

[129] J. L. Phelan, *The Millennial Kingdom of the Franciscans in the New World*, 2nd edn. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), esp. 5–28.

Florence's hegemony. And for Joachites like Savonarola, Jerusalem in Judaea retained its key eschatological role, so that city too could not be forgotten.[130] The complexity of the overall situation is best illustrated by reference to Castile. There was indeed in Castile 'a sacralized national geography', to use Alain Milhou's phrase, but it coexisted with a fascination with the 'real' Jerusalem which led Castilian Joachites to lay much emphasis on a crusade, to be initiated in Iberia, which would recover Jerusalem.[131] The 'Judaean Jerusalem' played a large role in the thinking of Columbus as well as in the approach of the early missionaries in the Americas. They considered their preaching to have an eschatological as well as a pastoral function: the baptism of these newly discovered *gentes* would form the prelude to the Last Days. Eventually, of course, creole society would break free from these restrictive eschatological parameters to assert its own identity. When it did so it was perhaps predictable that it would create its own sacred geography centring on its own, unique shrines.[132]

One of the European cities widely hailed as a New Jerusalem in the early fifteenth century was Prague. But Prague's standing, like that of Rome, differed radically according to the viewpoint of the observer. For moderate Hussites Prague was a *sacrosancta civitas*, as Jerome of Prague termed it in 1409. It was the illustrious capital of the 'most Christian' kingdom of *sacra Bohemia*, and it was also home to Hus's Bethlehem Chapel and the University of Prague, seedbeds of the reformed faith.[133] Its identification with Jerusalem was perhaps facilitated by the fact that Jan Milíč of Kroměříž, usually regarded as the first Czech reformer, had founded a community for repentant prostitutes in Prague which bore that name.[134] The Hussite song 'Arise, arise, great city of Prague' eulogized the city as Jerusalem, threatened by 'the king of Babylon'.[135] Jan Želivský preached that the Czechs had been blessed by God with the rediscovery of the gospel; from Prague they would spread the message of reform, evangelizing the rest of Christendom anew.[136] For Catholic Czechs the city had indeed once deserved the name of Jerusalem, 'on account of the most fair vision of peace which your hard work bestowed on the length and breadth of the kingdom'; but now that it was in the hands of the Hussites it had degenerated into the source of discord and

[130] D. Weinstein, *Savonarola and Florence: Prophecy and Patriotism in the Renaissance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[131] Milhou, *Colón*, 287–434.

[132] Phelan, *Millennial Kingdom*; J. Lafaye, *Quetzalcóatl and Guadalupe: The Formation of Mexican National Consciousness 1531–1813*, trans. B. Keen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

[133] F. Šmahel, 'The Idea of the "Nation" in Hussite Bohemia', *Historica*, 16 (1969), 143–247, 17 (1969), 93–197, at 16 (1969), 173–8.

[134] T. A. Fudge, *The Magnificent Ride: The First Reformation in Hussite Bohemia* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 49–51, 189; Šmahel, 'Idea of the "Nation"', 17 (1969), 103. A. Molnár, 'L'Évolution de la théologie hussite', *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses*, 43 (1963), 133–71, at 136–40.

[135] Fudge, *Magnificent Ride*, 189 (text); Šmahel, 'Idea of the "Nation"', 17 (1969), 103.

[136] S. Bylina, 'Le Mouvement hussite devant les problèmes nationaux', in D. Loades and K. Walsh (eds.), *Faith and Identity: Christian Political Experience*, SCH, Subsidia 6 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 57–67, at 63–4.

confusion.[137] And for the radical Taborites Prague was a New Babylon, inadequately reformed and still in thrall to the Catholic church. Like its namesake of old, 'it must be destroyed and consumed by the faithful'.[138] In the sermons which he wrote on the Apocalypse in *c.*1430, at a time when relations between the Hussite centre and left were becoming increasingly strained, Nicholas of Pelhřimov, the bishop of the Taborites, was particularly caustic about Prague. The Masters of its University had returned to 'papal ways' like dogs to their vomit. 'Many consider themselves to be Christians who are actually impious and murderous residents of Sodom, Gomorrah and Babylon.'[139]

These contrasting views of Prague reveal something of the confusion created by the interaction of national feeling centred around Old Testament ideas, eschatological programmes, and religious radicalism. To exert its fullest impact on warfare this interaction needed a revolutionary situation of precisely the type which Bohemia offered. And this makes Hussite Bohemia an excellent place to start a more in-depth analysis of the range of religious warfare which we have surveyed here.

[137] 'Litera de civitate Pragensi continens lamentationes de actis et factis quondam ab haereticis ibidem commissis', in K. Höfler (ed.), *Geschichtschreiber der husitischen Bewegung in Böhmen*, 2 vols. (Vienna: Kaiserl. Königl. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1856–65), ii. 311–19, at 311.

[138] LoB, 'De gestis et variis accidentibus regni Boemiae 1414–1422', in Höfler (ed.), *Geschichtschreiber*, i. 321–527, at 435.

[139] Bartoš, 'Táborské bratrstvo', 111, 122, and see also 104, 121.