


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Richard O. Spertzel

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
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Ron G. Manley

During the negotiation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the 1980s and 1990s, a keenly debated aspect of the draft convention was the question of on-site inspection. However, the simple presence of inspectors is not enough on its own—they have to have equipment with them to help them in their

tasks and to be able to measure and assess what they can see. While it seemed at the beginning of the negotiations that concluding definitions of inspection equipment would be a simple technical task, it moved from the technical into the political sphere as the debate continued on the powers and intrusiveness of inspectors.

In this book Ron G. Manley, a former Director of the Verification Division of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, examines the political and technical issues associated with inspection equipment used under the CWC starting with the negotiations in Geneva and the preparatory phases before entry into force of the convention.

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
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Nicholas A. Sims, London School of Economics and Political Science

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